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Abstract
In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues 
that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, 
that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which 
there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that 
‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock 
Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks 
and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of 
course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of 
Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out 
consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and 
names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke 
himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted 
from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of 
descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, 
they can be. 
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I
In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity 1980, Kripke famously argues 
that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more proper-
ly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in 
which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds simi-
larly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been 
Sherlock Holmes, had he existed’. He notes the “cryptic brevity” of 
these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—
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the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures 2013. Coming as 
it does at the end of Naming and Necessity it is natural to read this 
discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist 
picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much 
is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can 
the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended inde-
pendently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, 
as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be. In fact, not only 
is this clear from the John Locke Lectures, but it is also clear from these 
that this is what Kripke himself thinks. Kripke’s plausible claims in the 
Addenda provide no evidence against descriptivism.1
I begin by sketching out the line of argument from the rejection of 
descriptivism to Kripkes’s theses about unicorns (or ‘unicorns’) and 
Sherlock Holmes (or ‘Sherlock Holmes’) it is natural to construct, 
having read only Naming and Necessity. Then I go on to explain, dra-
wing first on the John Locke Lectures, how these theses can be defended 
without assuming the rejection of descriptivism. There are two lines 
of defence: one that proceeds on the assumption that the terms in 
question are fictional names of individuals and kinds, and a second 
which takes them to be mistakenly introduced, and so to be empty 
names of individuals and kinds (obviously, this second defence cannot 
support Kripke’s specific claim about Sherlock Holmes, but another 
1 A referee wonders whether this line of defence of descriptivism is not, per-
haps, “a bit futile”, since “many philosophers of language regard Kripke’s argu-
ments against descriptivism as decisive”, so ‘‘why bother to show the consistency 
of Kripke’s two theses with descriptivism if descriptivism was proven to be false’’. 
Many philosophers do regard descriptivism as refuted by Kripke, but not all. In-
deed, some of the most eminent philosophers of language writing in the post-Krip-
kean years do not. Michael Dummett (1973, 1981, 1991) and David Lewis (1984, 
1997) consistently rejected Kripke’s arguments. (As a reminder, Lewis (1997: 339) 
writes: “Did not Kripke refute the description theory …. I disagree… A version 
… survives, causal descriptivism.”) The equally eminent Jackson (1998, 2010) and 
Chalmers (2002) led the “descriptivist revival”—as described by Soames (2005)—
in the twenty-first century. Description theories are still among the views to which 
students are exposed in standard textbooks and handbooks (see for example 2021, 
four chapters of which, by Jackson, Noonan, Poller, and Wikforss and Häggqvist 
explicitly defend forms of descriptivism). So descriptivism is still a live option. 
However, unless the descriptivist can account for the data in Kripke’s Appendix—
which are, I think, indeed data—descriptivism must be abandoned. That is why the 
task I have set myself in this paper is not futile.
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example about which Kripke would say the same, and, in fact, does 
say the same, is Vulcan, the hypothetical intra-Mercurial planet hypo-
thesized by Jacques Babinet in 1846).
II
The argument from Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism about proper 
names to his contention that “one cannot say of any possible person 
that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed” is easy. Ac-
cording to the Kripkean picture no description (not itself embed-
ding the name) is semantically associated with a name. A name is 
introduced in a baptism in which its reference is fixed—either by 
a description or ostensively, the latter of which Kripke is willing to 
bring under the head of association with a description. But then as 
the name is subsequently used and passed on from user to user the 
original description may fall away. In subsequent uses the name, still 
used as the name of the original individual, may be associated with 
no description or wholly erroneous ones—ignorance and error are 
no bars to reference with proper names on the Kripkean picture. 
Secondly, proper names are rigid designators, a proper name has the 
same reference with respect to every possible world and satisfies the 
intuitive conjunctive test for this being so given by Kripke: a singular 
term ‘X’ is a rigid designator if and only if ‘X might not have been X’ 
and ‘something other than X might have been X’ are unambiguously 
false.
Given this picture of the behaviour of names, Kripke’s contention 
about Sherlock Holmes seems undeniable. There is in fact no man 
who answers to the description of Sherlock Holmes in the stories (the 
only description we can possibly regard as fixing its reference, though 
it may, incidentally, not be implied anywhere in the stories that it is 
uniquely satisfied), so one cannot say of any possible person that he 
would have been Sherlock Holmes if he had existed, since different 
people (merely possible or indeed, actual, such as Darwin and Jack 
the Ripper) might have performed the exploits of Holmes described 
in the stories. The argument does not explicitly appeal to Kripke’s 
view that proper names are rigid designators, but it is implicit since 
it appeals to the idea that different people could have satisfied the 
only relevant description and therefore no one of them could have 
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been Sherlock Holmes since, of course, rigid designators have the 
same reference across all possible worlds. Of course, although Kripke 
does not explicitly argue in this way, if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a (non-
denoting) rigid designator whose reference is fixed by some such de-
scription as ‘the consulting detective living at 221B Baker Street and 
…’, ‘it might have been that Sherlock Holmes existed’ must have the 
same truth-value as ‘Sherlock Holmes might have existed’ and ‘the 
detective living at 222B Baker Street etc., might have existed’ (rea-
ding the last with the description having wide scope). But the last of 
these cannot be true, since there is in fact no individual denoted and 
there are no merely possible individuals (as Kripke would insist), so 
the description is non-denoting.
Similarly, Kripke’s thesis about unicorns can easily be justified 
given his contention that general terms for natural kinds should 
be assimilated to proper names of individuals and regarded as non-
descriptive rigid designators of these kinds, so that ‘tiger’ (or ‘the 
tiger’) is the rigid designator of an actual species and ‘unicorn’ (or 
‘the unicorn’) is the rigid designator of a mythical species. There are 
several distinct hypothetical species (some mammalian, some reptile-
an) which would have had the external appearance of unicorns in the 
myth. No one of them can therefore be such that we can correctly say 
of it that it ‘would have been the species of unicorns’ if it had existed 
and been so describable.
All this seems to follow so simply from Kripke’s contentions 
about names and natural kind terms that it is tempting to think that 
this is the way Kripke’s contentions in the Addenda must be argued 
for, and, therefore, that their plausibility provides further support 
for his anti-descriptivist picture (in addition to the support provided 
in the body of Naming and Necessity). Nevertheless, I shall argue, this 
is not so. Convincing arguments for Kripke’s contentions—in fact, 
some given by Kripke himself—can be given which do not require 
rejection of descriptivism.
To see clearly what is going, on, however, we need to distinguish 
two hypotheses (i) that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘unicorn’ are fictional 
names (of an individual and a kind) and (ii) that they are empty names 
introduced in error. This is a distinction Kripke notes. (2013: 30–1) 
The difference is that according to the first hypothesis ‘Sherlock Hol-
mes’ was never intended, when it was introduced, to name any indi-
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vidual, whereas, according to the second (of course, false) hypothesis 
it was, but a mistake was made (as actually happened with ‘Vulcan’). 
Mutatis mutandis for ‘unicorn’. On either hypothesis Kripke’s theses 
about the unspecifiability of situations which it would be correct to 
describe as ones in which Sherlock Holmes/unicorns existed can be 
defended without presupposing anti-descriptivism. But the two de-
fences must proceed somewhat differently.
III
First let us consider the hypothesis that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘uni-
corn’ are fictional names. What does this mean? According to many 
people and argued for wholly convincingly by Kripke in the John Locke 
Lectures, it means that they are not names at all (in their primary use—
I will come back to this qualification). They are no more names than 
a stage murder is a murder. Hence, they are no more non-designating 
names than they are designating names. They have no semantic value. 
In the case of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ what actually happened is that Co-
nan Doyle dipped his pen in ink one morning and began to write a 
story. That is, he proceeded to pretend that he was a doctor called ‘Dr 
Watson’ with a friend called ‘Sherlock Holmes’ about whose exploits 
he was giving an account. He was no more actually writing down a 
name (non-empty or empty) than the actor on the stage pretending 
to murder a vicar is actually murdering a vicar. The actor is doing 
something. He might, for example, be hitting a fellow actor over the 
head with a piece of foam shaped like a hammer, but he is not mur-
dering a vicar. Similarly, Conan Doyle was doing something. He was 
making marks on paper, with certain shapes familiar to readers of 
English, but he was not writing a name (something semantically eva-
luable as designating or not), or writing sentences containing a name se-
mantically evaluable as true or false. As Kripke puts it: 
[N]ames which occur in fictional discourse are, so to speak, “pretended 
names”, part of the pretence of the fiction. The propositions in which 
they occur are pretended propositions rather than real propositions; or 
rather, as we might put it, the sentences pretend to express a proposi-
tion rather than really doing so. (2013: 29) 
Of course, what Kripke says here is not quite what he means, since 
he is here not considering genuine names, like ‘London’, which are 
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also used in fiction (he considers them elsewhere 2013: 24). But the 
important thing to note is the careful qualification. Names which oc-
cur in fictional discourse are ‘so to speak’ pretended names; in truth 
they are no more names than stage murders (most of them!) are not 
murders. The propositions in which they occur are pretended propo-
sitions, not real ones, ‘or rather, the sentences pretend to express a 
proposition rather than really doing so’. When Conan Doyle wrote 
the Holmes stories he was not therefore telling the truth, but nor was 
he telling lies (contrary to Russell’s claim that fiction is a pack of lies). 
He was not making any assertions or performing any sort of illocuti-
onary act at all. He was, as said, merely pretending to be a doctor ma-
king assertions about a friend of his called ‘Sherlock Holmes’ (note 
that we cannot say ‘he was pretending to be a doctor making asser-
tions about his (i.e., the doctor’s) friend, Sherlock Holmes’). He was 
therefore producing nonsensical marks juxtaposed, of course, with 
real words (as in ‘Holmes lived in London’), just as the actor on stage 
pretending to murder a vicar is performing certain actions directed 
towards real things and people (the props and other actors), though 
he is not performing the action of murdering directed towards some-
one who is a vicar.
The same is true, on Kripke’s account of the first use of ‘unicorn’. 
Something analogous to Conan Doyle’s writing the first Sherlock 
Holmes story occurred and the fiction of unicorns was instituted. 
So ‘unicorn’ is not a name of a non-existent natural kind; it is not a 
name at all. Sentences in the story are not genuine truth-evaluable 
sentences, and so on.
Illuminatingly, in Reference and Existence (2013: 51) Kripke discus-
ses Lewis Carroll’s nonsense poem ‘Jabberwocky’ and, in particu-
lar, the nonsense term, ‘bandersnatch’ (‘bandersnatch’ as nonsense 
should be contrasted with the contradictory term ‘round square’; we 
know this is contradictory precisely because we know its meaning, 
so it is not nonsense). To say that there are no counterfactual cir-
cumstances which it would be correct to describe as ones in which 
‘Sherlock Holmes existed’ or ‘unicorns existed’, he says, is on a par 
with saying that there are no counterfactual circumstances it would 
be correct to describe as ones in which ‘bandersnatches existed’. Le-
wis Carroll’s term is merely more obviously lacking in sense than 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ or ‘unicorn’ because “we are not told any surface 
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characteristics, other than that a bandersnatsch is frumious; and ap-
parently a frumious animal is a very dangerous one, or anyway one 
that should be shunned” (2013: 51). An important difference which 
makes it more evident that ‘bandersnatch’ is a nonsense term is that 
it is not associated with any superficial characteristics and, in fact, a 
creature’s surface characteristics are, in fact, a pretty good guide to 
what species it is. Hence we are less inclined to regard ‘unicorn and 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ as nonsense terms. But really, they are, “the situa-
tion is not really so different”:
The term ‘bandersnatch’ is just a pretended name of a species; it doesn’t 
really designate a species, and once one knows that this is the case one can-
not say under what circumstances there would have been bandersnatch-
es. ... I think that the case of ‘unicorn’ is no different [given] that the 
term ‘unicorn’ is merely pretense, no hypothetical species is named. ... 
And the status of the predicate ‘is a unicorn’ should be precisely analo-
gous to that of the hypothetical name ‘Sherlock Holmes’. (2013: 52–3)
Earlier Kripke (2013: 47, fn. 15) sums up the point: “I should 
not be taken as saying that it is impossible that there could have been 
… unicorns. … Rather, the counterfactual possibility is ill-defined, 
given that there are no unicorns.”
All of this is so evidently correct that the reader may be wonde-
ring why I am labouring the point. But the important thing to notice, 
for present purposes, is that one does not have to reject descripti-
vism or accept Kripke’s historical chain picture to acknowledge it. 
The account is an account of storytelling as pretence and the con-
sequences of that. It can be accepted on its merits irrespective of 
one’s view of the right thing to say about genuine names and natural 
kind terms used outside any pretence. Kripke emphasises this. He 
notes that some descriptivists have thought that it was an advantage 
of their position that they could account for fictional proper names. 
For example, a merit of descriptivism, it has been claimed, is that it 
can account for the meaningfulness of ‘Odysseus was set ashore at 
Ithaca while sound asleep’ (Frege) or even the truth-evaluability of 
sentences containing the name ‘Apollo’ or ‘Hamlet’ (Russell).2 But 
Kripke rejects this: 
2 Of course, the standard arguments against descriptivism, stated in Naming and 
Necessity (1980: 27–9) and set out, for example, in the first chapter of the introduc-
tory text by Ahmed (2006) do not appeal to the phenomenon of fiction.
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The existence of fiction is a powerful case for absolutely nothing, it can-
not settle the question between the Russellian theory and the Millian 
theory. Nor can it settle the question between Mill’s theory and any 
other. (2013: 23)
This is because, 
when one writes a work of fiction it is part of the pretence of the fiction 
that the criteria for naming, whatever they are, are satisfied.... Far from 
it being the case that a theory of the reference of names ought to make 
special provision for the possibility of such works of fiction, it can forget 
about this case, and then simply remark that, in a work of fiction … it is 
part of the pretence …. that these criteria are satisfied.... So I will call 
this ‘the Pretense Principle’ … it would apply to any theory of naming 
whatsoever. (2013: 23–4)
So, to labour the point yet again, someone who endorses even the 
most unsophisticated form of the description theory of names, has no 
truck with the notion of a rigid designator and simply says that names 
and natural kind terms are merely abbreviations for definite descrip-
tions, fully synonymous and interchangeable with them in all con-
texts, can perfectly well agree that circumstances it would be correct 
to describe as ones in which Sherlock Holmes existed are ill-defined 
because ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is not a name; it is merely a part of the 
pretence that it is, and hence part of the pretence that the criteria for 
its being so (i.e., its being, he says, synonymous with a description) 
are satisfied. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, of ‘unicorn’, and in 
this way the two cases are exactly the same as that of ‘bandersnatch’, 
about which it is merely a pretence of Carroll’s that it satisfies the 
criteria for being a name of a kind of unpleasant animal.
So a theorist who thinks that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘unicorn’ are 
fictional terms can accept Kripke’s Addenda contentions about them 
without being under any pressure to reject descriptivism.
Of course, there are more things to be said about Kripke’s ac-
count of fiction making as pretence. There are several bones of con-
tention. And someone might think that in order to resolve these one 
must reject the descriptivist account of genuine names, or at least 
that a descriptivist will be hard put to resolve these whilst accepting 
the Kripkean account of fiction-making as pretence. In this way, it 
might be said, the Kripkean is, after all, in a better position to accom-
modate Kripke’s Addenda contentions about ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and 
‘unicorn’ by appeal to the fictionality of these terms than a descrip-
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tivist is. I do not think this is so (nor do I think that Kripke himself 
would wish to endorse this line of thought). But I shall briefly discuss 
the bones of contention with this in mind.
The first is this. It is not only the case that there are no circum-
stances which it would be correct to describe as ones in which Sher-
lock Holmes would have existed, it is also undeniably correct to say 
‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist and never did’. Similarly, ‘unicorns 
do not exist and never have’, and ‘bandersnatches do not exist and 
never have’. But how can this be? This is the problem of negative exis-
tentials. It confronts anyone who accepts Kripke’s account of fiction-
making as pretence because according to this these ‘sentences’, on 
the use the account explains (as components of works of fiction), are 
neither true nor false but nonsense. Yet plainly, as we standardly use 
them, they are not.
As Kripke explains, one can easily imagine finding out that things 
are such that it is correct to say ‘bandersnatches exist/did exist’. 
We could find out that Lewis Carroll’s intentions were not what we 
thought. He was not engaged in storytelling. He was writing, in the 
form of a poem, a straightforward report of the local fauna in his boy-
hood neighbourhood. In fact, we might uncover a letter in which he 
responds to an enquirer by saying that he is quite surprised that peo-
ple think he is talking about imaginary animals. Actually, he himself 
used to encounter bandersnatches occasionally when he was a young 
boy, though he was warned by his parents to avoid them because they 
were frumious, and indeed these words seem to have dropped out of 
common use.
Of course, we know that is not the way things are. Carroll was just 
writing fiction, and we can report this fact by saying that bandersnat-
ches do not exist and never did.
But how, then, is the use of the term in this context to be explai-
ned? Kripke struggles manfully with this perplexity and arrives at a 
complicated story which has satisfied no one and about which he will 
say only that it is better than anything else he can think of. One worry 
is that it is in conflict with his own account of naming and requires 
some sort of notion of indirect reference more at home in a Fregean 
account (see Salmon 2011: 64). I only want to note now that the pro-
blem of these negative existentials does not in any obvious way point 
to a problem for descriptivists which is not equally a problem for 
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Kripkeans, nor does it give any reason to think that descriptivists can-
not endorse Kripke’s account of storytelling as pretence. Of course, 
descriptivists have, to the contrary, argued that the intelligibility of 
negative existentials is a point in favour of their account. But Kripke 
convincingly shows that this is not so. Whatever descriptive materi-
al,  ‘blahblahblah’, pertaining to bandersnatches, we can extract from 
Carroll’s poem, when we say ‘bandersnatches do not exist’ we do 
not mean ‘there is nothing satisfying the description: blahblahblah’, 
any more than when we say ‘unicorns do not exist’ we mean ‘there 
is nothing answering to the description …’, where this is one that 
can be extracted from the unicorn myth, or when we say ‘Sherlock 
Holmes does not exist’ we mean ‘there is nothing answering to the 
description …’, where this is one that can be extracted from the 
Conan Doyle stories. As Kripke says, even if there were, unknown 
to Doyle, someone actually satisfying such a description it would not 
be correct to describe the discovery of such a person as the discovery 
that Sherlock Holmes existed. Whatever the resolution of the prob-
lem of negative existentials is, then, there is no reason to think that it 
must either favour or, the crucial point for our purposes, be inimical 
to descriptivism.3
The second well-known bone of contention about fictional na-
mes is their use as names of fictional characters, as in e.g., ‘Sherlock 
Holmes was inspired by one of Doyle’s university teachers’. Again, 
whatever the correct thing to say about this is, this use is no argument 
against descriptivism or the availability to descriptivists of the Krip-
kean pretense account of storytelling.
I earlier described the use of ‘Holmes’ by Conan Doyle as its ‘pri-
mary use’. But in fact, on the Kripkean story it is not, since it is not a 
use at all, but a pretence of one. But there does seem to be a genuine 
use of the name as a name of a fictional character in sentences of the 
type just mentioned, a use of it as a name of a genuinely existent enti-
ty, on a par, as a human creation, with the story, ‘A Study in Scarlet’, 
or the United States of America (see Kripke 2011: 63). Kripke recog-
3 Sophisticated Lewisean descriptivists may suggest that when one says ‘Sher-
lock Holmes does not exist’ one means ‘there is no such person as the person I have 
heard of under the name ‘Holmes’’, or maybe ‘there is no such thing as the causal 
source of this token: Holmes’ (Lewis 1997). But there are objections to this (see 
Salmon 2011).
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nises this. Similarly, there does seem to be a genuine use of ‘unicorn’ 
and ‘bandersnatch’ as names of fictional kinds, which are not kinds, 
like the tiger or water, no more than the character Sherlock Holmes 
is a man, but are nonetheless genuinely existent human creations.
If so, descriptivists need not demur. As genuine names of genui-
ne entities, on their view they will be associated appropriately with 
descriptions. But saying this does not require them to depart from 
the Kripkean position that in the original fictions these terms are 
meaningless ‘pretended names’, nor therefore is there any difficulty 
for them in accepting Kripke’s Addenda contentions about ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ and ‘unicorn’ understood as fictional names.
The third bone of contention about fictional names is their appa-
rent use within critical discourse, sometimes, not always, within pre-
fixed assertions like ‘In the stories, Holmes was a cocaine addict’ or 
‘In the poem, bandersnatches are fast-moving’, which are apparently 
assessable as true or false. Again, these are problematic for Kripke 
since what follows the prefix can apparently express no proposition, 
since the nonsense names are not merely mentioned but used. Krip-
ke refers to these prefixes as ‘quasi-intensional’ but it is hard to see 
how they can be (Salmon 2011: 65). Once again, though, whatever 
one says about how to deal with this problem there seems to be no 
reason to think that it is any more of a problem for descriptivists than 
for Kripkeans. Descriptivists might be tempted to think that they are 
better placed to deal with it than Kripkeans. This seems unlikely, in 
the light of the arguments given by Kripke, but whether or not this 
is so, there certainly seems to be no reason to regard this problem 
as a reason for rejecting descriptivism or thinking that descriptivists 
cannot follow Kripke in regarding fictional names as merely preten-
ded names.4
4 A possible solution to the problem is to suggest that when the critic says, 
‘Sherlock Holmes uses cocaine’ (something that can verified by reading the stories) 
he is retelling (part of) the story. That is, he is himself pretending to be a narrator 
of the activities of someone called ‘Sherlock Holmes’. This then, is to be compared 
with my retelling of the bedtime story of the Three Little Pigs to my child, or 
perhaps with an actor, or different actors, acting out the same part on repeated 
occasions. So what he says is neither true nor false, just as Conan Doyle is not 
writing anything true or false. But about the critic we can ask a question we cannot 
ask about Doyle: is he in fact retelling Doyle’s story or telling or retelling another 
Harold Noonan62
In sum, then, I have argued in this section that contrary to the im-
pression one gets from Naming and Necessity even if Kripke is wrong 
to reject descriptivism his contentions in the Addenda about ‘Sher-
lock Holmes’ and ‘unicorns’ are still plainly correct if these are fic-
tional names and his account of storytelling as pretence is accepted 
(as it plainly should be).
IV
But are ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘unicorn’ fictional names? ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ certainly is, but I assume it is contentious whether ‘unicorn’ 
is. Moreover, even if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a fictional name there are, 
it seems, non-fictional empty names like ‘Vulcan’. But it seems that 
given that that name is in fact empty, the conclusion that there are no 
possible circumstances which it would be correct to describe as ones 
in which Vulcan existed is straightforwardly derivable from Kripke’s 
historical chain picture of reference. This seems to be the correct 
conclusion, but how can a descriptivist accommodate it?
So, despite the discussion of fiction just completed, the question 
whether the correctness of Kripke’s Addenda contentions, appropri-
ately generalized, is an argument against the description theory arises 
again. My view, explained in this section, is that though the question 
arises, it has a negative answer.
First, I need to be clear about the distinction between a fictio-
nal name like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and an empty name like ‘Vulcan’. I 
take it, following Kripke (2013: 31) that the distinction is that ‘Sher-
lock Holmes’ was introduced as part of a pretence by Conan Doyle 
who knew that was what he was doing, whereas the introduction of 
‘Vulcan’ was a mistake, a product of false belief. Thus, there was no 
attempt to introduce ‘Sherlock Holmes’ as a name by Conan Do-
yle. It was part of the pretence that it had already been introduced, 
one? This is the question whether his retelling is faithful to the original (which is 
what we have in mind in speaking of truth here). As for the prefixed assertion ‘In 
the story Holmes takes cocaine’, perhaps the prefix can be read as a scene-setting 
announcement: I am about to retell (part of) the story. Wait for it:’ This is sug-
gested by Predelli (2020: 84ff.). The only point I want to note is that this account 
(on which there is no use of a name by the critic any more than there is by Conan 
Doyle) is as much available to the descriptivist as the Kripkean.
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presumably by Sherlock’s parents, whereas ‘Vulcan’ was introduced 
(by Babinet) but the introduction failed. What actually goes on in the 
introduction of a name will be disputed by descriptivists and Kripke-
ans. But they will agree that for any genuine name there has to be an 
introduction, successful or not.
So consider the following case, which all will agree constitutes the 
introduction of a name. I fix the reference of the name ‘Tom Jones’ 
by stipulating that it is to name the man presently living in the old 
house over the river there who is always so rude and unsociable. Both 
descriptivists and Kripkeans will agree that if the description denotes 
my naming ceremony will have succeeded. Kripkeans will say that I 
have introduced a rigid designator the reference of which is merely 
fixed by the description and no association with the description or 
any description is needed for subsequent successful use of the name. 
Descriptivists will not agree. They will insist that some identifying 
knowledge of the bearer is required for successful reference, though 
they need not say that the name is synonymous (after its introduc-
tion) with the original introducing description, and they will not say 
that the name is a Kripkean rigid designator, though they may say 
(and arguably have to say) that in modal contexts its use is by conven-
tionally typically that of a wide-scope description (Dummett 1973: 
127ff., 1981; Lewis 1984: 223). But despite their disagreements they 
will agree that if the reference-fixing description denotes, the name 
will have been successfully introduced as the name of its denotation, 
and if the description does not denote (e.g., because there are in fact 
two men in the house) the introduction has misfired and ‘Tom Jones’ 
in this use is an empty name.
Now in this case the Kripkean will say that since ‘Tom Jones’ is 
a rigid designator of nothing ‘Tom Jones could have existed’ is false 
and so there are no circumstances it would be correct to describe as 
ones in which Tom Jones would have existed. There might be other 
circumstances in which a single man was in the house, in different 
circumstances different men, and these need not be merely possible 
men, but could be (different) actual men. But there is no circum-
stance of which it would be correct to say, ‘If that circumstance had 
obtained Tom Jones would have existed’. For if so, which one?
So even though ‘Tom Jones’ is a genuine name, not a fictional 
name, it is still the case that there is no possible world properly de-
Harold Noonan64
scribable as one in which Tom Jones would have existed. The diffe-
rence made by the name being empty rather than merely fictional 
is just that ‘Tom Jones could have existed’ is false rather than, like 
‘Sherlock Holmes could have existed’, meaningless.
Now, however, the descriptivist can just say the same about the 
empty case, as long as he does not regard ‘Tom Jones’ as synonymous, 
interchangeable in all contexts, with its reference-fixing description 
and so a flexible designator. Given that there are two men living in the 
house, the statement ‘The man living in the house might have existed’ 
is ambiguous between a true statement with the description given 
narrow scope, and a false one with the description given wide scope. 
Hence if the name behaves by convention as a wide-scope description 
in such modal contexts (which appears to be what descriptivists have 
to say to account for the observed linguistic phenomena) ‘Tom Jones 
could have existed’ is false. So descriptivists, like the Kripkean, can 
accommodate Kripke’s Addenda observations about ‘Sherlock Hol-
mes’ even if it is not a fictional name, but an empty one.
What about the unicorns? It is, of course, unclear whether ‘uni-
corn’ is a fictional name of a kind, like ‘bandersnatch, ‘tove’, ‘ali-
corn’5 and probably ‘dragon’—maybe there is no right answer. But 
even if ‘unicorn’ is an empty name rather than a fictional name, given 
the Kripkean assimilation of natural kind terms to proper names of 
individuals and the reasoning by which the Kripkean can establish the 
necessary non-existence of the bearers of empty names, it is unpro-
blematic that Kripkeans can affirm that there are no circumstances it 
would be correct to describe as ones in which unicorns existed. The 
remaining question then is whether a descriptivist can endorse this 
conclusion. He can affirm the corresponding thesis containing emp-
ty names of individuals because he can endorse widescope descrip-
tivism for them (Dummett 1973, 1981, Lewis 1984). Comparably, 
he can endorse widescope descriptivism for natural kind terms, like 
‘tiger’, and maintain that they differ in their behaviour in modal con-
texts from descriptions like ‘large carnivorous, quadrupedal cat-like 
animal, tawny-yellow in colour with blackish transvers stripes and a 
5 From the children’s My Little Pony television series. Princesses Celestia and 
Luna are alicorns, unicorns with wings (though it is disputed on Wikipedia whether 
they have been so from birth).
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light belly’ (Kripke 2013: 44, quoting the Oxford English Dictionary). 
If he can do this he can explain why, assuming ‘unicorn’ is an empty 
natural kind term, ‘unicorns could not have existed, like ‘Tom could 
have existed’, is false.
But the value of the explanation thus available to the widescope 
descriptivist may be challenged, given that it depends upon an appeal 
to a general convention which makes false a wide range of modal 
statements.6 It is important then to note that the widescopist con-
vention need not be regarded as ad hoc. Typically, such descriptivists 
hold that different descriptions, some deferential, are associated with 
a name by different speakers and at different times. Given such vari-
ation in descriptive association a convention whereby names should 
be given wide scope in modal contexts has an easily comprehensible 
rationale, stated briefly by Lewis (1984: 243, with footnote acknow-
ledgement to Noonan 1979):
There may or may not be rigidification. If there is that will avoid con-
fusion between people who have attached the same name to the same 
referent by different descriptions. For nothing will be true as one per-
son means it, but false as the other means it, not even when the name 
appears in modal contexts.7
6 But note here exactly what the widescopist descriptivist’s convention is: it is 
that names have wider scope than modal operators; it is not that they have wider 
scope than any operators, including, for example, negation. Thus, according to the 
widescopist view the name has wider scope than the modality in ‘Vulcan could 
have existed’ (though note the caution in footnote 7). But it is left open whether 
the name has wider scope than the negation in ‘Vulcan necessarily doesn’t exist’ 
(compare the non-modal negative existential ‘Vulcan doesn’t exist’—of course, 
the Kripkean has difficulties with both of these if he wants to say that they are true 
since it is not true of anything that it is a (necessary) non-existent). In fact, it is 
consistent for him to hold that other conventions governing the scope interaction 
of names with negation in existential statements require the negation to have wider 
scope than the name in these negative existentials. He can alternatively consistently 
say that ‘Vulcan necessarily doesn’t exist’ must be read with the name having widest 
scope, the modal operator intermediate scope and the negation narrowest scope 
and so the statement must be read (like ‘the present King of France/the round 
square necessarily doesn’t exist’) as self-contradictory.
7 Of course, what one does not do only because one is following a convention 
is something one can do. And when the rationale for the convention does not ap-
ply one may. Thus, Dummett (1973: 111ff.) considers the name ‘St Anne’, which 
is such, he assumes, that all users associate it with the description ‘The mother of 
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But it may be objected that the widescopist strategy cannot, in 
fact, adequately explain Kripke’s explananda on the assumption that 
the relevant names are empty and not fictional. For (here I quote an 
anonymous referee):
It can help descriptivists only as far as modal sentences are concerned. 
... It can allow them to say that the sentence ‘Vulcan could have existed’ 
is false. But consider the non-modal sentence ‘Vulcan exists’. According 
to the descriptivist it expresses the same proposition as the existential 
sentence containing the definite description allegedly synonymous with 
‘Vulcan’. But if as assumed the description is only contingently empty, 
that proposition is only contingently false. Then there are possible cir-
cumstances relative to which the proposition expressed by ‘Vulcan ex-
ists’ is true. Now aren’t these circumstances in which Vulcan exists, or, 
to use Kripke’s phrase, circumstances properly describable as ones in 
which Vulcan would have existed?
The answer is ‘No’. The referee’s question in effect challenges the 
widescopist to deny that ‘There are possible circumstances in which 
Vulcan exists’ is true. But the sentence ‘there are possible circumstan-
ces in which Vulcan exists’ is not understood unless it is understood 
as strictly equivalent to ‘Vulcan could have existed’ (Kripke 1980: 
18, fn. 16).8 The latter is a modal sentence. So to be successful the 
the Virgin Mary’, know nothing more and know that all other users are in the same 
condition (in his 1991: 48 he presents the same argument against Kripke substitut-
ing St Joachim’ (the father of the Blessed Virgin) for ‘St Anne’ to make this point 
more obvious). In this case, he argues, the reading with the name having narrow 
scope comes into view, so ‘St Anne might never have been a parent’ will be heard 
as ambiguous. He notes that Kripke can say the same but will locate the ambiguity 
in the type of modality in question, epistemic or metaphysical, whereas he thinks, 
appeal to scope is the more conservative explanation. Kripke himself gives ‘Jack the 
Ripper’ (1980: 79) as a similar example. ‘Vulcan’ may, in fact, have the same status. 
Donnellan (1977) argues that in the case of such unusual names as ‘St Anne or ‘Jack 
the Ripper’, or Kripke’s example ‘Neptune’, as first used by Leverrier, which are 
pegged to an introducing description during a particular time period, the name 
may in that time period be indeterminate between a rigid designator and a flexible 
designator. This is consistent with Dummett’s position.
8 That is the short answer. The referee is, of course, expounding the anti-wides-
copist response of Kripke’s Preface in the 1980 edition of Naming and Necessity, 
which is replied to by, amongst others Dummett (1981, 1991). A key part of the 
reply is that (even given that ‘Vulcan’ is associated at all times only with the descrip-
tion ‘the intra-Mercurial planet’) ‘Vulcan exists’ is not synonymous with ‘the intra-
Mercurial planet exists’. It is part of our understanding of the former sentence, 
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widescopist’s strategy only needs to help as far as modal sentences are 
concerned. So I conclude that a sophisticated widescopist account of 
names of individuals and kinds can accommodate the intuition that, 
assuming that ‘Vulcan’ and ‘unicorn’ are empty names, there are no 
possible circumstances properly describable as ones in which Vulcan 
would have existed and no possible circumstances properly describa-
ble as ones in which unicorns would have existed.
The point is perhaps harder to see in the latter case because whe-
ther ‘unicorn’ is in fact a merely empty term or a fictitious name is 
unclear. So I will finish by sketching a hypothetical case of something 
which is clearly an empty natural kind term. In Material Beings (1990: 
104) van Inwagen imagines a community, the inhabitants of Pluralia, 
who are in contact (from a distance) with what appears to be a kind 
of large, black, very timid, tiger-like animal. They introduce the term 
‘bliger’. Later they discover that there are no bligers. What appears 
to be a bliger is really six animals. Its ‘legs’ are four monkey-like crea-
ture, its ‘trunk’ a sort of sloth, and its ‘head’ a species of owl. The 
illusion is amazing.
There are no bligers, nor is there any circumstance of which 
unlike the latter, according to the descriptivist, that one recognises that it contains 
a name, hence is subject to the widescopist convention. But what one understands 
when one understands a sentence is its meaning. Hence the two sentences dif-
fer in meaning and in one sense of ‘proposition’ express different propositions. 
In another sense they express the same proposition: what one asserts when one 
utters either assertively is the same. Dummett thus distinguishes between ingredi-
ent sense (wherein the sentences differ) and assertoric content (wherein they are 
identical) (Dummett 1981: 572, 1991: 48). Evans (1978) accepts Dummett’s dis-
tinction, using ‘proposition’ for ‘ingredient sense’ and identifying the proposition 
expressed by a sentence with a function from worlds to truth-values (see Rabern 
2017 for a survey of related literature). Thus, in Evans’s scheme the proposition 
expressed by ‘Vulcan exists’ is a function whose value for any argument is the truth-
value F, whereas the proposition expressed by ‘the intra-Mercurial planet exists’ is 
a function whose value for a world w is T iff it is true relative to w that there is a 
unique intra-Mercurial planet. So the referee’s statement ‘there are possible cir-
cumstances relative to which the proposition expressed by ‘Vulcan exists’ is true’ is 
true only if ‘proposition’ is read as ‘assertoric content’. But the inference to ‘there 
are circumstances in which Vulcan exists’ is valid only if ‘proposition’ is read as 
‘ingredient sense’. What is undeniable is that ‘there are possible circumstances in 
which Vulcan exists’ must be understood as having the same truth-value as ‘Vulcan 
could have existed’. 
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it would be correct to say ‘if that circumstance had obtained the-
re would have been bligers’ (though, of course, if the circumstance 
had been as the Pluralians originally supposed they would have been 
correct in asserting ‘There are bligers’). ‘Bliger’ as it is supposed to 
be used in this story is not a fictional name; it is an empty name, like 
‘Tom Jones’ if in fact there are two men living in the house by the 
river. However, the Kripkean view that there is no possible circum-
stance correctly describable as one in which ‘there would have been 
bligers’ is correct but, I have argued, can be accommodated by the 
(sophisticated) descriptivist as well as the Kripkean.
V
I conclude that even if Kripke is wrong to reject descriptivism in the 
body of Naming and Necessity, he is right in the Addenda in his con-
tention that no circumstance is properly describable as ones in which 
Sherlock Holmes or unicorns existed and that this is so whether these 
are fictional names or merely empty ones, though the reasons differ 
in the two cases, and only a sophisticated widescopist descriptivist 
(like Dummett or Lewis) can agree with Kripke if, in fact, these na-
mes are merely empty.
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